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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (hereinafter “March Agreement”), the
procedure of the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia (hereinafter “ECC”) shall be in
accordance with existing Cambodian criminal procedural law with exceptions in the following
instances: 1) where Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter; 2) where there is
uncertainty regarding the interpretation or application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law; or 3)
where there is question regarding the consistency of such a rule with international standards.2
In these instances, guidance may be sought in procedural rules established at the international
level.3 This memo first addresses which due process rights may require interpretation, defining,
or further protection by the Tribunal due to the above-mentioned omissions or ambiguities in
Cambodian procedural law. Specifically, the Tribunal likely must examine the permissibility of
trials in absentia; balance the due process rights of the accused with the necessary protection of

1

Per agreement with the United Nations, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter
“ECC”) is to be governed by Cambodian law and procedure. In addition, the Law on the Establishment of the
Tribunal ( hereinafter “LEC”) and the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (hereinafter “Agreement”) provide that the Tribunal shall have subject matter jurisdiction
over the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions as Defined
under treaty and customary international law. Moreover, the Agreement stipulates that Articles 14 and 15 of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”) shall be respected in the proceedings of
the Tribunal.
What features of Cambodian law and procedures are likely to diverge from those international law
provisions, requiring resolution by the Tribunal?
2

Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 12(1), UN GAOR 3d Comm., 57tthe Sess.,
Annex Agenda Item 109(b), U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter “March Agreement”] [Reproduced at Tab 53].
3

Id. [Reproduced at Tab 53].
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witnesses; and determine whether former amnesties may serve as a bar to prosecution. Second,
this memo addresses the practical impediments to due process rights, among these including a
possible lack of an independent and impartial judiciary; and the discretion of ECC officials in
consulting international standards.
B. Summary of Conclusions
Article 13(1) of the March Agreement provides that those prosecuted by the ECC shall be
afforded the same minimum due process guarantees enumerated in Articles 14 and 15 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”).4 Pursuant to Article
12 of the March Agreement, when Cambodian criminal procedural law does not deal with a
particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or application of a
rule, or where there is a question regarding the consistency of a rule with international standards,
guidance may be sought in procedural standards at an international level.5
Brief Conclusion Regarding Three Procedural Issues Requiring Resolution by the Tribunal
i.

Although Cambodian criminal procedural law is marginally unclear regarding
prohibition of trials in absentia, these will likely be prohibited as running contrary to
international due process standards; and, if permitted, serve to decrease the legitimacy
of the ECC proceedings.

ii.

As has been done in previous war crimes tribunals, the ECC must balance the due
process rights of the accused with necessary protective measures for witnesses.

4

March Agreement supra Note 2, Art. 13(1). Rights explicitly enumerated in Art. 13(1) include: the right to a fair
and public hearing; to be presumed innocent until proved guilty; to engage a counsel of his or her choice; to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defense; to have counsel provided if he or she does not
have sufficient means to pay for it; and to examine or have examined the witnesses against him or her. [Reproduced
at Tab 53].
5

Id. Art. 12. [Reproduced at Tab 53].
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Because such measures are not elaborated upon in existing Cambodian criminal
procedure, finding this balance will likely represent a significant task for the Tribunal.
iii.

Despite the lack of a specific provision in the March Agreement or the LEC,
previously-granted amnesties and pardons will not likely bar prosecution before the
ECC.

Practical Impediments to Enforcement of International Due Process Standards
i.

Due to dubious Cambodian commitment to holding Khmer Rogue officials accountable
and the possible carryover of domestic corruption into the ECC, judicial impartiality and
independence may be prevented. Two significant contributing problems are the
Cambodian control by numbers and voting by way of super-majority.

ii.

Because ECC prosecutors and judges are granted discretion in their decision to consult
international standards, this leaves room for arbitrariness and inconsistencies in
application.
***
As this memo addresses, the ECC possesses enormous potential to hold former Khmer

Rogue; bring justice and afford closure for the victims; and provide a historical record of the
atrocities committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. Simultaneously, however, an
important and formidable task of the Tribunal rests in the awkward merging of Cambodian
criminal procedural law and international due process standards.

11

II. Factual Background
The United Nations and Cambodia engaged in negotiations for the establishment of a
tribunal to try former members of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge party beginning in 1997.6 U.N.
Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia Thomas Hammberger persuaded the new
government to formally request aid from the United Nations in assisting to bring justice to
members of the Khmer Rogue for the atrocities they committed between 1975 and 1979.7 These
talks derailed after five years, largely due to United Nations concerns that the Cambodian plans
for the Khmer Rogue Tribunal failed to ensure impartiality, impartiality, and objectivity.8 The
current provisions relating to the structure and composition of the ECC reflect these uneasy
negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian government regarding the ECC’s
establishment.9
Two of the early procedural issues that arose were the inter-related concerns relating to
the proper application of Cambodian law of criminal procedure and whether there was a
“controlling” source of domestic criminal procedural law. Other than the 1993 Constitution,10
Cambodian criminal procedural law is governed by two major instruments: the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (hereinafter “UNTAC Code”)11 and the State of Cambodia

6

Daniel Kemper Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rogue Tribunal. 44 Harv. Int’l L.J.,
551 at 551 (Summer 2003). [Reproduced at Tab 5].

7

Aaron J. Buckley, The Conflict in Cambodia and Post-Conflict Justice, in Post-Conflict Justice (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Ed), pg. 647 (2001). [Reproduced at Tab 13].
8

Id. [Reproduced at Tab 13].

9

Donovan, supra. [Reproduced at Tab 5].

10

Unofficial Translation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, entered into force on September 21, 1993
at its 2nd Plenary Session, Amendments Passed on March 4th, 1994. [Reproduced at Tab 73].
11

Provisions Relating to the Judiciary and Criminal Law and Procedure Applicable in Cambodia During the
Transitional Period, Decision of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, 10 September 1992 [hereinafter
“UNTAC Code”]. [Reproduced at Tab 67].
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(hereinafter “SOC”) Law on Criminal Procedure. Two conflicting views exist on priority.
Because SOC was adopted after the UNTAC code, it may have abrogated that law.12 On the
other hand, UNTAC might control because SOC was adopted during a period of “transition:”
between the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 until the adoption of the
Constitution in 1993.13 Accordingly, a problem presented early on was whether one of two
sources of Cambodian criminal procedural law controlled in case of conflict or whether guidance
should immediately sought at the international level. Then, another problem exists because
Cambodia is currently in the process of drafting another criminal procedural code. If this is
adopted by the Cambodian government, it is unclear whether it would become the procedural
law for the tribunal, thereby changing the rules midstream.14
Legal Argument
III. With Ambiguity, Comes Freedom: The Problem in Protecting Ambiguous
International Standards of Justice
A fundamental problem in upholding international due process standards exists when it is
uncertain what falls under the definition of “international standards.” Some commentators argue
that it is difficult to discern non-derogable rules and principles of international criminal law
because there is no clear theoretical foundation at their basis.15 Nonetheless, a general framework

12

Goran Sluiter, Due Process and Criminal Procedure in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers. 4 J. Int’l Crim.
Just. 314 at 319 (My 2006). [Reproduced at Tab 41].

13

Id. [Reproduced at Tab 41].

14

Dinah Pokempner, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Criticisms and Concerns, In Justice Initiatives, 32, at 38 (April
2006).
15

G. Nice and Roland P. Valleires-Roland, Procedural Innovations in War Crimes Trials. 3 Journal of International
Criminal Justice. 354, 357 (2005). [Reproduced at Tab 37].
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for international due process standards has emerged, as crystallized in the ICCPR, to which one
hundred fifty-four states, including Cambodia, are parties.16
International due process standards come from a variety of sources reflecting the general
practices and views of the international community. As noted by Article 38(1) of the
International Court of Justice Statute, sources of international law include: international
conventions; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations; and judicial decisions and teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists…”17 This body of sources presents a comprehensive,
albeit imperfect notion of fundamental international standards of due process which has served
as a guideline for international judicial bodies.
There are, however, a number of due process rights over which controversy has recently
arisen regarding whether they meet this definition of “basic” or “absolute.” Derogation from
these rights has been challenged particularly in other modern war crimes tribunals; and various
ambiguous or uncertain provisions of Cambodian criminal procedural law necessarily require
resolution by the Tribunal. In particular, three issues may emerge: the permissibility of trials in
absentia; the proper balancing of a defendant’s due process rights with necessary witness
protective measures; and whether previously-granted amnesties will serve as a bar to
prosecution.

16

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. G.AOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. [Reproduced at Tab 60].

17

Statute of the International Court of Justicece. [Reproduced at Tab 76]
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A. Cambodian procedural law permitting trials in absentia may run contrary to
international due process standards.
Cambodian criminal procedural law permits the trial, judgment and sentencing of an
absent criminal defendant.18 Article 13 (“Rights of the Accused”) of the March Agreement
stipulates that all criminal defendants enjoy the minimum guarantees afforded in Articles 14 and
15 of the ICCPR, further stating that: “such rights shall, in particular, include the right to a fair
and public hearing; to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; to engage a counsel of his or her
defense; to have counsel provided if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and to
examine or have examined the witnesses against him or her.”19 Although Article 14(3)(D) of the
ICCPR provides the accused’s right to be present during his trial,20 the drafters of the Law of the
Extraordinary Chambers (hereinafter “LEC”), which law governing the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers (hereinafter “Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers”) opted not to
include it in the list of due process rights already included within the ICCPR. Article 35 of the
LEC provides “minimum guarantees” to the accused, but it does not mention a prohibition
against trials in absentia in its enumerated list of due process guarantees.21 Notably, instead of
applying the entire ICCPR, the drafters of the LEC instead chose to list specific rights contained
within it. This might permit “picking and choosing” of those procedural rights to apply from

18

State of Cambodia Law of Criminal Procedure, Art. 111 and 114. It should be noted, however, that Art. 111
permits trials in absentia only in the event that the defendant is properly summoned but fails to appear. [Reproduced
at Tab 69].

19

March Agreement supra [Reproduced at Tab 54].

20

ICCPR, supra Art. 14(3)(D).Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171. [Reproduced at Tab 60].

21

Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/0801/12. [Reproduced at Tab
63].

15

Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR. Because the personal jurisdiction of the Extraordinary
Chambers is limited to “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most
responsible for the crimes referred to in Article 1 of the [March] Agreement,”22 some of these
individuals may be particularly elusive or deceased due to the passage of time- thus unavailable
for prosecution. Given the narrow scope of the ECC’s personal jurisdiction, the right against
trials in absentia may have been deliberately excluded so as not to impede the prosecutions from
proceeding.
Having acknowledged the possible motive for permitting trials in absentia, we now
address whether this violates international standards of due process. Early post-WWII tribunals
provided for trials in absentia. For example, Martin Borman, Nazi Party Chancellor Head
Secretary and Private Secretary to Hitler, was sentenced to death by the Nuremberg Tribunal in
his absence.23 However, commentators note that recent international tribunals provide much
more comprehensive due process protections, as representing the development of the uniform
application of standards. As Father Robert Araujo, professor at law of Gonzaga University
observed, “…fifty years have elapsed since the Nuremberg prosecutions began and human
wisdom has become increasingly conscious of the prohibitions against violating fundamental
human rights…”24 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”) and the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”) statutes both
22
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prohibit trials in absentia;25 as does the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to
which Cambodia is a party.26 Accordingly, one might argue that the Extraordinary Chambers’
prohibition against trials in absentia is a prerequisite to its legitimacy. Because the March
Agreement and LEC represent almost a decade’s long period of negotiation between the United
Nations and Cambodia, it does not seem likely that the United Nations would approve a tribunal
that allowed trials in the absence of the major defendants.
Therefore, despite the practical purpose of permitting trials in absentia and their debatable
allowance within the State of Cambodia Law on Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “SOC”), trials
in absentia appear impermissible within the ECC. Trials in absentia have not been permitted in
recent international criminal proceedings, save in cases in which an accused in custody disrupted
or refused to attend the proceedings. As noted by Goran Sluiter, professor in international
procedure at the University of Amsterdam, “such a general rule against trials in absentia can
without difficulty be considered a part of the international standards in the sense of Article 12(1)
[of the March Agreement].”27 This is evidenced by other recent international criminal
proceedings, in which trials in absentia are prohibited save for cases in which the accused, once
called to the courtroom, waives the right by disrupting the proceedings.28 Because, as mentioned
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above, the March Agreement specifically incorporated Article 14 of the ICCPR, and SOC
permits trials in absentia under limited circumstances, one might assume that the ECC will
follow the general prohibition against trials in absentia.
In contrast, Article 4(4) of the UNTAC Code implicitly provides for trials in absentia
because it states that there is an extra 15-day period added in the case of a judgment pronounced
in absentia. Article 5 of the UNTAC Code (which also grants the prosecutor the right to appeal)
also says that appeals can be heard in absentia. Accordingly, the tribunal likely must resolve
whether Cambodian criminal procedural law is uncertain or ambiguous in permitting trials in
absentia; and, if they are permitted, whether this runs contrary to international standards.
Unlike the August 1979 proceedings against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, which were not
supported by other governments or international organizations,29 the prosecution of senior
Khmer Rogue members by the hybrid tribunal has the capacity for legitimate criminal
procedures due to extensive and continued U.N. involvement, both in the shaping of the March
Agreement and LEC and in financial support. The trials and sentencing of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary
were conducted in absentia, largely regarded by the international community as “sham” trials
intended to assert the legitimacy of the new government.30 In light of this negative history, it is
crucial that if the ECC chooses to use trials in absentia, it does so only when absolutely
necessary and when in accordance with the international standards recognizing specific
exceptions to a general disallowance against trials in absentia.
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Limited Exceptions to the General Prohibition Against Trials in Absentia
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR statute stipulates that the right to be present is absolute by
specifically providing against derogation. Article 63(2) of the Rome Statute provides exceptions
to the requirement that the accused must be present at trial.31 These narrow exceptions, however,
are provided only in those instances mentioned above in which the accused makes the conscious
chose not to be present. States find it unacceptable when trials in absentia are conducted without
the accused’s presence at any stage of the proceedings.32 Because of the importance of these war
crimes tribunals, which aim both to offer an accurate historical record of past atrocities and to
bring justice to the victims, trials in absentia are largely prohibited in order to preserve the
legitimacy of the proceedings. “ ‘Show trials’ diminish the court’s authority by creating an image
of a ‘powerless institution delivering hollow judgments.’ Trials in absentia are perceived as a
sign of judicial weakness- the practice has always been a last-resort measure.”33
Proponents of trials in absentia argue that they are necessary for the effective and
efficient running of the criminal justice system. Trials in absentia require less investigatory work
by police, less time for trial, and less expense.34 Another issue particularly relevant to the ECC is
the argument that if an accused person is not available for prosecution, a trial in absentia protects
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the victims’ rights to bring the perpetrators to justice and mitigates the difficulties with obtaining
or preserving the evidence if the accused is not caught within a reasonable period of time.35
Cambodia presents a unique situation due to the passage of time since the commission of the
crimes to be tried. One might argue that because of the importance of providing some historical
record of the atrocities and bringing victims closure, the trials should be allowed to proceed
following a reasonable search for an elusive perpetrator.
Simultaneously, however, because the atrocities rendered by Khmer Rouge members
occurred nearly three decades ago, one might also argue that the most important objective of the
tribunal is to publicly bring these members to justice. As the last trials for which Cambodia is
remembered are the “sham” trials of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, it is vital that the proceedings of the
ECC not resemble these in the attributes for which they were most criticized. Most notorious, of
course, is the absence of the defendants.

B. Witness Protection Measures: Finding the Balance
The LEC balances the rights of the accused with those of the witness in Article 33: “The
Court shall provide for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protective measures shall
include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in-camera proceedings and the protection of
the victim’s identity.”36 This provision affords less protection than the similar statutes for the
Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, which, in addition to providing for in-camera proceedings and
the protection of the witness’s identity, state: “The International Tribunal shall provide in its
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rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses.”37 Both the Rwanda
and the Yugoslavia tribunals go further in providing for the protection of witnesses in their Rules
of Procedure and Evidence.38 The LEC also falls far short, both in specificity and substantive
content, of the witness protective measures afforded by the Rome Statute of the ICC.39 On face,
Article 33 of the LEC raises two preliminary concerns: 1) It does not explicitly provide for
witness protection either before or after the proceedings; and 2) unlike the statutes for the
Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, it affords specific protection only to “victims.” Pursuant to the
discretionary power granted to the court in Article 33, those fitting into the category of
“witnesses” but not “victims” could theoretically be granted no protection by the court without
violating the LEC.
As with any court procedure, the accused’s due process rights must be balanced with
necessary protections afforded to the witnesses. A right articulated in Article 14(2)(e) of the
ICCPR, and reinforced in both Article 13 of the March Agreement and Article 35 of the LEC, is
for the accused “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him.” Here, trial proceedings differ from most domestic proceedings due to the absence
of a jury. Though the value of having a witness testify in court may be somewhat diminished by
judges functioning as both the finders of fact and of law, experience may give them an edge in
assessing the credibility of witness testimony despite how it is presented. Obviously, however,
37
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the ECC must not be too lenient in permitting anonymous witness testimony. In the Tadic trial,
for example, some contended that despite the Tribunal’s detailed rules of procedure, it treaded
dangerously close to denying the defendant a fair trial by allowing certain prosecution witnesses
to testify anonymously and to permit the prosecution to base much of its case on heresay.40
Another issue is whether allowing the anonymous testifying of witnesses denies the right of the
accused to “a fair and public trial” under article 14(1) of the ICCPR.41 Such arguments give
weight to the issue of whether denying an accused’s right under Article 14 of the ICCPR
represents a substantial infringement, and whether the right should be construed as absolute.
Recent international court decisions have held that an accused’s right to a fair and public
trial under Article 14 of the ICCPR is not absolute, depending on individualized circumstances
warranting the giving of anonymous witness testimony. Most notably, in the first case tried by
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991 (hereinafter “ICTY”), Prosecutor v. Tadic,42 Trial Chamber II of the ICTY ruled in a
preliminary motion for protective measures to allow for the use of measures, including
confidentiality and anonymity, to protect witnesses.43 The majority opinion, written by Judge
McDonald, concluded that the use of anonymous witnesses is consistent with the Statute of the
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Statute)44 and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.45 Notably, the Trial Chamber rejected the notion of applying international
standards, as defined by other judicial bodies, to resolve procedural questions, instead opting to
consider its own “unique requirements.”46 Though the Protective Measures decision
acknowledged that “in principle, all evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused at
a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument,” judge McDonald qualified the general
rule by stating: “however, the interest in the ability of the defendant to establish facts must be
weighed against the interest in anonymity in the witness…a fair trial means not only fair
treatment to the defendant but also to the prosecution and witnesses.”47
A similar balancing test was employed in the ECHR Kostovski v. Netherlands,48 which
preceded the ICTY Protective Measures Decision in Tadic.49 Kostovski indicated safeguards that
can be taken to “redress any diminution of the right to a fair trial” due to anonymous testimony.
Although Judge McDonald borrowed these guidelines from the Kostovski case, he emphasized
that “these standards must be interpreted within the context of the unique object and purpose of
the International Tribunal, particularly recognizing its mandate to protect victims and
witnesses.”50 Guidelines borrowed include: 1) the judge’s ability to observe the demeanor of the
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witness, 2) the judge’s right to be aware of the identity of the witness; 3) the affording of defense
counsel ample opportunity to question the witness on issues unrelated to his or her identity or
current whereabouts, and 4) the release of the witness’s identity once there are no longer reasons
to fear for the security of the witness.”51
In the context of the Extraordinary Chambers, adequate witness protection is imperative
to the legitimacy, adequacy and thoroughness of the proceedings. As one commenter noted:
“it is understandable that some victims might hesitate to support the CEC in absence of assurances
that their participation is not held against them before, during, or after the trials. …Regardless of the
reality of any risk, given the high levels of trauma still suffered by many Khmer Rogue victims,
further measures will be needed to reassure them.”52

Current Cambodian criminal procedural law provides few specific modes of witness protection.
As mentioned, Article 33 of the LEC allows “in-camera proceedings;” and the UNTAC Code
prohibits witness “coercion.”53
Trials may be severely compromised by victims’ and witnesses’ refusal to testify. Given
that few defendants fall under the ECC’s personal jurisdiction;54 combined with the deficiencies
in witness testimony caused by the passage of time,55 the ECC theoretically may be more willing
to grant additional measures of protection to ensure important witness testimony. One issue that
51
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might emerge is what safeguards may be employed unique to the Cambodian tribunal; and which
might be borrowed and modified from other tribunals. Among others, these might include:
providing separate entrances for victims and witnesses (so they may control how they encounter
defendants or their supporters), counselors during the course of the trial, monitoring and social
services afterwards, and options for relocation.56
A correlative issue is what means may be used for protection without exceeding the scope
of the intent of Article 33 of the LEC or violating international due process standards. The
Tribunal might consider Cambodia’s status as a party to the Rome Statute, which holds that the
ICC must “permit their [victims’] views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of
the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court.”57 This must be consistent with
defendants’ rights.58 As mentioned above, the ECC might look for guidance to measures used by
other international tribunals, comparing its circumstances to those considered in procedural
decisions made by other courts in its determination of “necessary” witness protection measures.
Interestingly, since Tadic, the ICTY has not granted the extreme remedy of complete witness
anonymity.59
As in Tadic, witness protective measures are most likely to be sought by the CoProsecutors pursuant to Article 20 of the LEC.60 Provisions for protective measures represent a
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“gap” in existing criminal procedural law, which must be filled by balancing the rights of the
witness or victim with those of the defendant as is consistent with international law. Because of
the continuing influence of the Khmer Rogue party, as compared with measures recently
employed by other international tribunals, the ECC may be able to employ more extreme modes
of protection without a finding of a violation of the accused’s due process rights. Take, for
example, the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure’s provisions allowing for the exclusion of the press and
the public from proceedings for various reasons including the safety or non-disclosure of the
identity of a victim or witness from the public.61 Depending on what the ECC deems
“necessary,” such provisions may provide exceptions to the accused’s general due process rights
as afforded in the ICCPR and Cambodian criminal procedural law. Particularly noteworthy is the
fact that the trials are to take place on a military base in Phnom Penh.62 Given that the military is
afforded immunity from legal process in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity, this may prove intimidating to potential witnesses63 Fear that the military may be used
for political retaliation might lead to the requirement of additional protection.
The importance of witness protection to the tribunal’s legitimacy should not be
underestimated. Bringing the men responsible for the atrocities that wiped out literally one fifth
of the nation’s population is a matter of not only moral obligation, but also of profound social
and political significance to the people. As noted by the Group of Experts for Cambodia:
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For accountability first and foremost is a statement to the millions of Cambodian victims and their
relatives and friends that their cries have at last been heard, providing the survivors with a sense of
justice and some closure on the past. Justice is also a critical element for repairing the damage done
to that society by the massive human rights abuses and for promoting internal peace and national
reconciliation. By having those who committed the abuses identified and punished, Cambodian’s can
better understand their own past, finally place this most tragic period and those responsible for it
behind them, and work together to build a peaceful and better future.64

Providing witnesses with adequate means of protection, thus facilitating their active role
in the proceedings, diminishes the image engrained in the international community of
Cambodia’s 1979 “show trials” and demonstrates the nation’s departure from its tradition of
impunity and movement towards accountability of top officials. Victim involvement in the
proceedings enhances their overall legitimacy by injecting their perspectives into the case and
lending additional transparency into the outcome of the case.65
C. Allowing amnesties to stand may undermine the perceived legitimacy of the ECC.
One unresolved issue between the UN and Cambodia following the establishment of the
Tribunal was whether previously-granted amnesties to former Khmer Rogue officials precludes
their prosecution by the ECC. Article 11(1) of the March Agreement states: “The Royal
Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for any persons who may be
investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in the present Agreement.” Article 40 of the
LEC states: “The Royal Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for
any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6,
7 and 8 of this law.” There is, however, no explicit invalidation of previously-granted amnesties
and pardons. Article 11(2) of the March Agreement reads, in pertinent part: “…there has been
only one case, dated 14 September 1996, when a pardon was granted to only one person with
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regard to a 1979 conviction on the charge of genocide. The United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia agree that the scope of this pardon is a matter to be decided by the
Extraordinary Chambers.” This provision represents a minor victory for the Cambodian
government in its negotiations with the United Nations, as the latter previously insisted on a
provision that previous pardons or amnesties would not be a bar to prosecution.66
Only one individual falls under the provisions of Article 11(2) of the March Agreement.
Ieng Sary, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Democratic
Kampuchea, who was sentenced to death in 1979 on the charge of genocide and for the crime of
membership in the Khmer Rogue in violation of the 1994 Law on the Outlawing of the
Democratic Kampuchea Group, was granted amnesty in 1996 by a Decree signed by King
Sihanouk.67 Ieng Sary, now seventy-six years old, lives in a luxury villa in Phnom Penh, as well
as maintains a home in Pailin.68
Due to the horrific nature of the offenses for which he was convicted, Ieng Sary’s
amnesty may not be honored during the course of the ECC proceedings. Disregarding the issue
of whether the amnesty itself was legitimate, the tribunal must address whether honoring the
amnesty represents either a miscarriage of justice or de-legitimizes the Tribunal in the eyes of the
international community; or, conversely, whether re-trying Ieng Sary for his prior acts constitutes
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a violation of the double jeopardy clause contained within the ICCPR69 Notably, while both
Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR are incorporated into the March Agreement,70 the LEC makes
no provision against double jeopardy despite explicitly affording other rights to the accused.71
Moreover, the LEC grants the co-prosecutors of both the trial and appellate courts to appeal both
courts’ verdicts;72 The SOC also includes the prosecutor as among those possessing the right to
appeal.73 Accordingly, while the LEC may not explicitly state that amnesties are not a bar to
prosecution, it is strongly inferred in Cambodian criminal procedural law. Both the investigation
and possible prosecution of Ieng Sary may become matters of dispute between the Cambodian
and international investigating judges and co-prosecutors, requiring settling by a Pre-Trial
Chamber of five judges as provided in Article 20 of the LEC. Ieng Sary will be prosecuted if less
than four judges rule not to proceed.
In its decision of whether to honor Ieng Sary’s amnesty, the government might consider
the far-reaching implications of the ECC’s legitimacy. Like other war crimes tribunals, the ECC
embraces two major prerogatives: 1) to record accurately and truthfully those crimes at issue in
order to provide a historical record; and 2) to provide justice for those affected by the acts
committed between 1975 and 1979. Allowing Ieng Sary’s amnesty to stand may undermine these
prerogatives.
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Relative to the first prerogative, trials affording full due process rights represent the most
authoritative rendering of the truth. Prosecuting Ieng Sary may “generate a comprehensive
record of the nature and the extent of violations, how they were planned and executed, the fate of
individual victims, who gave the orders, and who carried them out.”74 In contrast, permitting
Ieng Sary to escape prosecution may leave many victims with unanswered questions. Turning to
the second prerogative, allowing Ieng Sary’s amnesty to stand may undermine the CEC’s
responsibility to provide justice. First, holding Ieng Sary accountable for a crime as abominable
as genocide is a duty owed to both living and deceased victims, giving significance to their
suffering and serving as a partial remedy for their injuries.75 Second, failing to prosecute may
breed further cynicism about the rule of law and distrust of the political system.76 Despite the
passage of time since the atrocities committed, many victims’ emotional scars remain fresh.77
Allowing Ieng Sary to remain in his “luxury villa” may be perceived, both by the Cambodian
populace and the international community, as furthering the tradition of impunity of
governmental officials. It suggests that even those “most responsible” under Article 1 of both the
March Agreement and the LEC are above the law, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the
ECC.
Conversely, prosecuting Ieng Sary may potentially cause civil unrest, as reflected in
Cambodia’s adamant refusal to provide in the LEC that previously-granted amnesties would not
bar prosecution. When the Cambodian government outlawed the Khmer Rogue in 1994, Ieng
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Sary was granted amnesty following his defection from the party as part of the government’s
campaign to obtain the defection of Khmer Rogue guerillas78 The Khmer Rogue is not obsolete
as a political party, and persistent political instability in Cambodia leaves officials otherwise
interested in Ieng Sary’s prosecution reluctant to sacrifice any popular support of the current
regime.79 Even if the victims of the Khmer Rogue party strongly support Ieng Sary’s
prosecution, the decision whether to prosecute may come down to a political one.
In a sense, the decision whether to honor Ieng Sary’s amnesty represents a double-edged
sword for the Tribunal. As mentioned, despite the persuasive policy justifications for his
prosecution, doing so may violate the double jeopardy provision included in Article 14 of the
ICCPR, which Cambodia both ratified and agreed to honor in the March Agreement. This may
be circumvented by arguing that the 1979 trials of Ieng Sary and Pol Pot were “show trials”
lacking the fundamental elements of due process and a verdict based on the evidence.80 Because
of the marked substantive defects in his trial, Ieng Sary was not convicted in accordance with the
law and penal procedure of Cambodia pursuant to Article 14 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, it may
be argued that the nature of Ieng Sary’s crime prohibits his entitlement to amnesty. Genocide, a
crime of both universal jurisdiction and in violation of customary law, may fall within a category
of those crimes for which amnesty is not available in accordance with international standards.
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II. Broken Enforcement Mechanisms: Major Impediments to Effective Protection of Due
Process Rights.
A. The lack of judicial impartiality and independence may prevent adequate protection
of the defendants’ fundamental due process rights.
International standards regarding the qualification as an “independent” or “impartial”
judiciary have been defined and refined since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948.81 They are codified in the following relevant universal legal
instruments: article 14 of the ICCPR (1966);82 Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary (1985);83 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990); and Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers (1990).84 Regional legal instruments also reinforce these international
standards, including: Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950);85
Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969);86 and Article 7(1) the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981).87
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The right to trial by an independent and impartial judiciary, enumerated in Article 14(1)
of the ICCPR88 and Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,89 has been
unambiguously defined by the Human Rights Committee as “an absolute right that may suffer no
exception.”90 The United Nations Human Rights Committee has held that the notion of
impartiality “implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about the matter put before
them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties.”91
Impartiality is also commonly construed as the basic requirement that a judge not be dependent
on or linked to a party in a trial either financially or at the family level.92 Independence of the
judiciary, as it is defined in Principle One of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, entails the independence or separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government.93 “This status or relationship of independence of the judiciary ‘involves both
individual and institutional relationships: the individual independence of a judge as reflected in
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such matters as security of tenure and the institutional independence of the court as reflected in
its institutional or administrative relationships to the executive and legislative branches.’”94
Enumerated Provisions for an Independent and Impartial Judiciary in Cambodian
Criminal Procedural Law
On paper, Cambodian criminal procedural law provides for the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. Article 10 of the LEC provides for the selection of chamber judges
“who have high moral character, a spirit of impartiality and integrity, and who are experienced,
particularly in criminal law or international law. ¶ Judges shall be independent in the
performance of their functions, and shall not accept or seek instructions from any government or
any other source.”95 The detailed provisions of Article one of the UNTAC code incorporate the
Basic Principles on Independency of the Judiciary into domestic law. Further, Article 38 of the
UNTAC Code addresses bribery and allows for the prosecution and removal from office of
officials who engage in bribe-taking or accept other inducements for a return favor. Article 58 of
the UNTAC code criminalizes those who corrupt or attempt to corrupt officials by promising
money, property, professional position or any benefit in exchange for certain actions. Lastly,
Cambodia’s liberal constitution (last amended in 2004) provides for the “separation of powers”
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in Article 51; and Article 128 states that the
judiciary “shall be an independent power” tasked “to guarantee and uphold impartiality and
protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens.”96
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Impediments to Preserving Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Practice in Domestic
Cambodian Criminal Procedure
Despite Cambodian legislative textual provisions for judicial impartiality and
independence, these may not translate in actual application. Suzanne Linton, Director of the
LLM Programme on Human Rights at the University of Hong Kong, identified numerous
obstacles to effective implementation. The first impediment is the ECC’s establishment as part of
the domestic courts of Cambodia despite the in-practice lack of respect for the separation of
powers.97 The vast majority of Cambodian judges are closely associated with the Cambodian
People’s Party (hereinafter the “CPP”); and powerful elements of the government such as
important political figures, the security appraratus, and the Ministry of Justice are widely
believed to exert overt and covert influence over the investigating judges and trial courts. These
include threats and physical assaults on judges; or the simple realization among judges that their
tenure, and often their prospect of future livelihood, depends on the approval of political
elements.98 Put simply, judicial impartiality and independence is prevented by external elements
and influences. This argument is supported by research conducted on Cambodia by international
bodies revealing a weak judicial system, highly prone to corruption, executive interference and
influence peddling.99
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Second, Cambodian judges wield judicial control by majority of numbers as provided by
the LEC.100 Accordingly, if bias factors into the Cambodian judges’ decisions, this possesses
potential to affect the legitimacy or fairness of the proceedings. Third, voting by way of supermajority has the propensity to create a Cambodian voting bloc.101 Fourth, there are inadequate
provisions for guaranteeing the personal security of judges; fifth, no binding codes of judicial
conduct exist; and six, there are inadequate criminal sanctions for interference with the course of
justice and the impartiality of the judiciary.102
Because of the above-noted doubts about the quality of the Cambodian judiciary, the
United Nations expressed in negotiations a strong preference for a majority of international
judges and a simple majority voting system.103 Despite U.N. lobbying, however, in the final
agreement, Cambodian judges comprise the majority of the trial court, the appeals court, and the
supreme court of the ECC pursuant to Article 9 of the LEC. It is therefore conceivable that the
judiciary of the ECC may suffer the same drawbacks faced by the domestic Cambodian
judiciary.
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Practical Impediments to the Independence and Impartiality of the ECC
i.

Judicial impartiality and independence may be precluded by external
influences.

As noted above, the judiciary of the ECC is a hybrid of international and domestic
systems. At least some of the judiciary’s susceptibility to outside influence will presumably be
mitigated by international influences. In correlation, because the Chambers are comprised of
both Cambodian and international judges, possible ignorance regarding international due process
requirements of the former will be lessened by the latter’s presumably superior expertise. Also,
as noted in reference to the hybrid tribunals established in East Timor, Sierra and Kosovo, the
appointment of international judges in these highly-sensitive cases may have aided in enhancing
the perception of the independence of the judiciary and therefore its legitimacy.104 Further, the
March Agreement protects against partiality in Article 3(7), which provides that “the judges shall
be appointed for the duration of the proceedings,” thus removing some of the risk for political
influence.
International Influence and Financial Backing: Is It Enough?
Despite the stigma of corruption attached to the Cambodian judiciary, the ECC might not
experience some of those factors contributing to such corruption. In contrast to “regular judges,”
who receive several hundred dollars per month, the judges appointed to the CEC will receive the
astronomical sum of sixty-five thousand dollars a year.105 A past criticism of the Cambodian
judiciary is that despite the presence of persons of character in the judiciary, they could easily be
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“bought.”106 ECC’s higher salary offers somewhat of a buffer to economic seduction. Further,
corruption might be decreased by the international community’s financial investment in the
tribunal, which affords it greater scrutiny by the eyes of the international community compared
with Cambodian domestic courts. The international community has shown enormous support for
the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers. The cost of the Khmer Rogue tribunal is estimated at
around $61.5 million U.S. dollars, and fifteen countries have contributed to this expense. Japan’s
contribution of $21 million U.S. dollars amounts to fully fifty percent of the total international
share of the budget.107 These donations by countries with a history of respect for due process
rights not only decrease the chances for corruption, but bring the ECC an air of legitimacy lacked
by Cambodian domestic courts. At the same time, however, a notable underlying problem is that
these states, referred to collectively as “The Group of Interested States” (hereinafter “GIS”),
have been criticized as having done little to ensure their money is well-invested. As of April
2006, GIS has not established a monitoring mechanism, published benchmarks of performance it
expects the EC to meet, or even declared publicly its commitment to ensure the EC adhere to
fundamental standards of international human rights and humanitarian law.108
The question here is whether increasing the salaries of the Tribunal judges, combined
with international influence, guidance and scrutiny will suffice for overcoming the deeplyentrenched problems of the Cambodian judiciary.
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A Potential Commitment Problem in Holding Khmer Rogue Members Accountable
One concern with the tribunal is the questionability of the government’s commitment to
holding Khmer Rogue members accountable. Accountability could create the following
problems for the Cambodian government: embarrass those members with ties to the Khmer
Rogue during the period of Democratic Kampuchea; interfere with the government’s policy of
granting de facto amnesties to the Khmer Rogue members; and threaten the general culture of
impunity from which Cambodia’s current governmental members benefit significantly.109 In fact,
in the excruciatingly long negotiations which occurred between Cambodia and the United
Nations, Cambodia ultimately succeeded in convincing the United Nations to create an
international tribunal with an extraordinarily limited personal jurisdiction focused on “senior
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea.”110 Steve Heder, political scientist and law professor at the
London University School of Oriental and African Studies, noted: “The most important reason
for the narrowness of the personal jurisdiction seems obvious: to screen from scrutiny those
members of the Royal Government who were ‘small fish’ during the DPK era, including Prime
Minister Hun Sen and other members of the (CPP) which dominates the political scene.111
Indeed, of those members comprising the “famously huge” 2004 Cambodian cabinet, none
belong in the category of “those most responsible” falling within the ECC’s personal
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jurisdiction..112 If Heder is correct, the continued influence of these former Khmer Rouge
members might result in the same judicial manipulation that characterizes the Cambodian
judiciary.
Simultaneously, however, Article One of the LEC does not necessarily require such a
narrow interpretation of jurisdiction. As observed by Kelly Dawn Askin, senior legal officer of
International Justice with the Open Society Justice Initiative, the terms “those who were most
responsible” may be interpreted broadly to permit some flexibility to prosecute both persons near
the top of the hierarchy and also the most brutal or notorious physical perpetrators, as well as
those indispensable mid-level actors who provided direct lines of communication between the
Central Committee and the ordinary cadre.113 Broader application under Article One, if used,
may serve to penetrate the general veil of impunity worn by Cambodian officials. Therefore,
once the trials are completed, they may have, in addition to providing justice to victims, “created
space and opportunity within Cambodia’s domestic judicial system, along with creating space
and opportunity within Cambodia to begin broader justice and accountability initiatives.114 In
other words, by not avoiding prosecuting certain individuals for political reasons, and equally
affording proper due process protections, the Tribunal will establish a standard for Cambodian
domestic courts to follow.
Arguably, the ECC will likely adopt Heder’s approach of construing personal jurisdiction
in a limited fashion rather than the broader application advanced by Askin. Because of
Cambodia’s deeply-entrenched “culture of impunity,” the civil discontent that could be caused
112
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by prosecuting members of the government; and the enormous increase in time and resources it
would take to try additional former Khmer Rogue members, the ECC will probably limit its
personal jurisdiction only those literally “most responsible.”
The ECC’s Composition of a Majority of Cambodian Judges, Combined with Voting by
Way of the Super-Majority, May Permit the Same Corruption Persistent at the Domestic
Level
International concerns, particularly those expressed by the United Nations, reflected an
early uneasiness with the ECC’s composition of a majority of Cambodian judges.115 The
tribunal’s composition of a majority of Cambodian judges may carry with it the same problems
of corruption existent at the domestic level. The Agreement’s establishment of system in which
Cambodian judges are afforded majority status introduces a potentially corruptive and
obstructive element, as these judges lack “the physical [and] professional security to simply
decide to behave differently.”116 Cambodian judges complain openly about receiving instructions
in cases from the highest political authorities and threats to their safety if they do not rule
accordingly. Physical attacks have occurred frequently since 1993, including a 2003 attack in
which a prominent judge was assassinated in broad daylight on a Phnom Penh Street.117 Given
this legacy of manipulation of the Cambodian judiciary, one difficulty is separating this problem,
as well as removing the stigma, from those members selected to serve on the ECC.
Another concern expressed by the United Nations, and indeed a source of debate in the
promulgating the LEC, is the requirement of a “super-majority” for all decisions made by the
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trial court, appeals court, and supreme court of the ECC. Basically, this system requires the
following: every decision rendered by the trial court, comprised of five judges, must have an
affirmative vote by four judges; every decision rendered by the appeals court, comprised of
seven judges, must have an affirmative vote by at least five judges; and every decision rendered
by the supreme court, comprised of nine judges, requires an affirmative vote of at least six
judges.118 This means that every decision must have the approval of at least one international
judge. As noted by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the super-majority arrangement at the
heart of the March Agreement not only virtually guarantees a voting bloc by the Cambodian
judges; but it also allows any investigation or prosecution backed by Cambodian co-prosecutors
or co-judges to go ahead.”119 Even if the international judges vigorously protest a spurious
investigation or prosecution, it will be permitted to go ahead pursuant to Article 20.120
Another uneasiness expressed by the United Nations with this “super majority” is that it
could result in a deadlock in decision-making. If no supermajority decides for either a conviction
or an acquittal in a given case, the LEC does not provide the next procedural step. This
mechanism will also affect the dozens of pre-trial and interlocutory decisions that the Trial and
Supreme Court Chambers will be required to make prior to final judgment. Unless the judges
quickly reach a common understanding on the application of the supermajority mechanism in
cases of no positive decision, trials stand considerable delay.121
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A Hypothetical Illustrative of Potential Deadlock Problems Caused by the Super-Majority
One potential “worst-case” scenario is if a trial of a senior Khmer Rogue member
presented sufficient evidence to prove him guilty of a crime against humanity. If the three
international judges in the Supreme Court Chamber voted “guilty” and the four Cambodian
judges all voted “not guilty” as a result of outside influence, neither unanimity nor the required
“super-majority” would exist. The final decision of the Supreme Court would contain both the
views “guilty” and “not guilty” and would not lead to a conviction. The Khmer Rogue leader
would then go free.122
The above example demonstrates that the system, as is, has the potential to lead to
complete deadlock. Because this system has explicit United Nations approval and in the example
all of the rules of the March Agreement have been followed exactly as it should, the criticism
that it was a mock trial would be countered by arguing that the United Nations had legitimized
such proceedings. In this scenario, a de facto mock trial would have taken place, but a mock trial
based on an agreement to which the United Nations consented.123 Because the system laid down
in the March Agreement has explicit United Nations approval, the United Nations could not
invoke Article 28 of the March agreement to withdraw cooperation from the Extraordinary
Chambers124 This outcome runs contrary to the purpose of the internationally-supported tribunal,
which is predicated on the final political transformation of Cambodia to a constitutional
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monarchy accepted and sustained by the world community.125 It undermines the goals of the
tribunal, which are to bring to end the impunity of the Khmer Rouge leadership, or to strike a
blow against Cambodia’s present-day “culture of impunity,” or both.126
ii.

The Cambodian judiciary’s lack of competence may prevent the ECC’s
independence and impartiality.

In its 1999 report on Cambodia, the United Nations Group of Experts identified the lack
of a trained cadre of judges, lawyers and investigators as one of the major impediments to a fair
and effective judiciary.127 World Bank data from 2004 revealed that one in six of Cambodia’s
one hundred seventeen judges, one in nine of its Supreme Court judges, and one in ten
prosecutors had law degrees.128 As the Group of Experts noted in its report submitted to the
Secretary-General, one of the legacies of Cambodia’s decades of civil conflict is the lack of a
qualified legal profession in Cambodia. Indeed, when the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) set up in 1992, “it found the legal system a complete shambles, with
court personnel not only ignorant of law but sometimes barely literate, and basic supplies, like
pencils and papers, lacking.”129Moreover, those attorneys who entered the profession during the
years of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea or the State of Cambodia received their training
under a system in which the courts were not independent. Although there may be enough
qualified judges by way of training to serve on the bench for trials of Khmer Rouge members,
125
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“the enormity of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities and the effect they appear to have had on every
household means that it would be difficult to find a judge free of the appearance of bias or
prejudice.130 This goes to show that prejudice may work both ways: on one hand, judges may fall
victim to external influences and pressure; on the other hand, pre-conceived notions of officials’
guilt may color their perception of evidence received at trial.
Another problem is the LEC’s specific requirement that the domestically-trained
Cambodian attorneys and judges refer to, and apply, international standards and law.131 Article
10 of the LEC provides that the judges appointed to serve in the Extraordinary Chambers be
“experienced, particularly in criminal law or international law.” It may be difficult to find
Cambodian judges well-versed in international procedural criminal law, as evidenced by judges’
current practice of seeking the opinion of the Ministry of Justice on the interpretation of articles
and the determination of offenses.132 Although the Minister of Justice’s recommendations enable
the judges to apply laws and procedures correctly, some critics express recognize this as a
necessary evil: though this involvement weakens the independence of the judiciary, it is
necessary under the present circumstances, in which the judges are not sufficiently experienced
to perform their work without guidance.133 The Cambodian judges’ looking to guidance
elsewhere may undermine the legitimacy or competence of the tribunal in the eyes of the
international community. On the other hand, the hybrid between an international and domestic
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court might provide a vital framework the Cambodian judiciary may use as a blueprint in
ascertaining proper application of international procedural rules.
Issues must be resolved by the trial chamber by a super-majority. It remains to be seen
whether there will be a deviation between the consensus reached by Cambodian judges versus
international judges on procedural issues, as opposed to those reached on the substantive reasons.
The influence by international judges represents an opportunity for Cambodian judges to gain
expertise in their application of international procedural law.
B. Textual manipulation may prevent officials of the Extraordinary Chambers from
consulting international standards.
i.

Ambiguity of those articles of the LEC providing for “guidance in procedural rules
at the international level” leaves their meaning up for interpretation.
The LEC provides several instances in which officials of the Extraordinary Chambers

may consult international law to resolve ambiguities and uncertainties in Cambodian criminal
procedure. Article 20 of the LEC grants such discretion to the co-prosecutors: “The coprosecutors shall prosecute in accordance with existing procedures in force. If necessary, and if
there are lacunae in these existing procedures, the co-prosecutors may seek guidance in
procedural rules established at the international level.”134 This same discretion is afforded to
ECC trial court judges135 and ECC appeals court judges.136 There is no such provision relative to
defense attorneys.
Facially, a number of problems emerge with granting this discretionary power to court
officials. First, there is the use of the word “necessary.” Cambodian criminal procedure is
governed by the UNTAC Code, SOC, and the Constitution. These instruments raise two
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problems: 1) conflict in their provisions; and 2) a question of priority. An example of the former
is opposition between Article 24 of the UNTAC Code, which allows the defense to call its own
witnesses and present its own evidence to the court; and Articles 130, 132 and 133 of the SOC
law, which do not provide for this right but instead attribute the judge a far more prominent role
in the presentation of evidence. The question here is whether the co-prosecutor, trial court, or
appeals court will find it “necessary” to “seek guidance at an international level” even if
Cambodian procedural law contains conflicting standards. A point worthy of note is that while
other provisions of the LEC use the mandatory language “shall,” the permissive language “may”
is employed relative to the decision to seek guidance at an international level. Accordingly, the
Tribunal might be required to resolve some, if not all, of the following questions:
a. If UNTAC and SOC law conflict, does this require necessary guidance at an
international level?
b. When UNTAC and SOC law conflict, will one always necessarily take
priority over the other and why?
c. If neither UNTAC nor SOC takes priority over the other, are there domestic
sources which can be consulted prior to seeking guidance at an international
level?
ii. “Guidance at an international level” provides no real indication of where such
guidance should be sought.
The second problem is interpreting what is intended by “guidance at an international
level.” Some critics have pointed out that the right granted not only to the Chambers, but also to
the Co-Investigating Judges and Co-Prosecutors, to “pick and choose what they want from
procedural rules at the international level to fill in the gaps in domestic law…has the potential
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not just to create chaos, but also allows for tremendous arbitrariness.”137 It is also unclear which
procedural rules established at the international level should be used to clarify weaknesses in the
Cambodian law. Potential options include the ICCPR, the Rome Statute of the ICC, the statute of
the ICTR and the statute of the ICTY. Though the existence of multiple options may appear
capable of causing confusion, this is a misconception due to the substantial similarity of most
international criminal procedural codes.”138
Because international sources conflict regarding the specific nuances of due process
provisions, the ambiguous wording “guidance at an international level” provides no clear
guidance for consultation of international sources. Moreover, one might argue that “borrowing”
from international procedural law prevents the setting of true precedent because the procedures
used do not necessarily carry over into Cambodian domestic law. If international criminal
procedural law trumps domestic criminal procedural law when the latter is ambiguous, uncertain
or conflicting, it remains to be seen whether the international law chosen to “fill in the gaps” will
be accepted as precedent-setting in a domestic context.
ii.

Although Cambodian procedural law may appear on its face to be compatible with
international norms, this may not be followed in practice.
Even if the LEC meets international due process standards, the relevant inquiry is

whether the ECC follows these standards in actual practice. As one commentator observed, “[an
on-paper examination of Cambodian criminal law] demonstrate[s] that most of the human rights
that advocates believe should be involved in the criminal process already exist, in theory.”139 In
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fact, Article 12 of the March Agreement provides that the ECC “shall exercise their jurisdiction
in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law as set out in
Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
Cambodia is a party.” Article 9 of the ICCPR, however, which protects against arbitrary arrest
and detention, was not explicitly enumerated in the March Agreement. This leads one to question
why the Cambodian and U.N. negotiators chose to include only articles 14 and 15 in the March
Agreement rather than applying the entire ICCPR.
This omission may represent a deliberate attempt to circumvent the application of
international due process norms. This argument is supported by examining a crucial difference
between article 33 of the CEC and article 33 of the Draft Khmer Rogue Statute, which provided
that trials were to be conducted “in accordance with existing procedures in force. Guidance may
also, as necessary, be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.” Due to the
alteration of the statute to its final form, emerging international procedural standards will only be
consulted if there is a gap in the domestic procedural law.140 Unlike the Draft Khmer Statute, it is
now less clear whether international trial standards are guaranteed.
As one last point on this issue, it must be re-emphasized that decision-making in the CEC
is governed by the rule of the super-majority. Accordingly, if procedural matters of the
Chambers, like the substantive matters, are to be resolved with the requirement of a supermajority, procedural matters may encounter the same bloc potentially faced by substantive
matters, preventing effective development and protection of international due process standards.
The Discretionary Power of International Consultation Need Not Necessary Entail Abuse
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Despite the dangers faced by the discretionary power granted to the CEC in consulting
international standards, serious infringement of due process rights compared with international
standards does not appear likely. The CEC appears intent on bringing members of the Khmer
Rouge to justice, and Cambodian criminal procedural law does not substantially deviate from the
standards recognized by the international community. U.N. scrutiny and the role played by
international judges may be able to blend domestic and international criminal procedural law in a
way to offer an unprecedented legitimization of the Cambodian judiciary.
Conclusion
Although the LEC was carefully crafted to safeguard both victims’ and defendants’ rights
for the dual purposes of rendering justice for human rights atrocities committed by the Khmer
Rouge Party during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea and to legitimize the Tribunal in the
eyes of the international community, several aspects of Cambodian domestic criminal procedure
may fail to live up to international standards. As the trials commence, trials in absentia;
appropriate witness protection measures; and whether previously-granted amnesties may serve as
a bar to prosecution all may become issues requiring resolution by the Tribunal.
Individual procedural nuances aside, the major impediment to protection of international
procedural standards remains a problem in enforcement. Due to various practical problems,
including pressure exerted by external political forces, corruption, and incompetence, the ECC
may suffer from some of the same drawbacks faced by the domestic courts. Because of
monitoring by the United Nations and the presence of international judges, however, the ECC
may be able to side-step some of the problems persistent at a domestic level.
Further, the tribunal’s discretionary power regarding legal interpretation may impede,
given the super-majority voting requirement and the Tribunal’s composition of a majority of
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Cambodian judges. One might anticipate that U.N. influence and the presence of international
judges may foreclose textual manipulation. Because procedural issues are resolved from within
the tribunal, which is compromised of a majority of Cambodian judges, the tribunal has the
potential to provide the Cambodian judiciary with experience and legitimacy.
Despite these cautionary points, international procedural guidelines are likely to be
adhered to during the proceedings of ECC. Cambodian criminal procedural law already respects
internationally-recognized due process rights on paper, and an internationally-financed tribunal
presided over by a minority of international judges provides the necessary materials for the
enforcement of these rights.
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